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This paper investigates public pension funding using a dynamic general 
equilibrium macroeconomic model (DSGE) that facilitates investigation of 
distortionary effects of fiscal and pension policy responses to ageing. The model 
is calibrated to the Finnish economy, which will encounter substantial ageing 
pressures in the near future. During the transition to an older population structure 
ageing costs can be substantially lowered by allowing public funds to smooth out 
the tax responses. Cutting down on pension prefunding at a time when the pace of 
ageing is at its peak reduces the necessary tax hikes and stimulates labour supply 
growth at the moment when the labour market is tightest. With smaller funding 
needs, ageing leads to a slower growth in labour costs, a better employment 
conditions and faster production growth. 
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Julkisen talouden rahastot ja väestön ikääntyminen 
pienessä avotaloudessa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 21/2008 
Helvi Kinnunen 




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan julkisen talouden rahastoja (erityisesti eläkerahastoja) 
tilanteessa, jossa väestön ikääntyminen aiheuttaa tuntuvia kokonaistaloudellisia 
kustannuksia. Tarkasteluissa käytetään dynaamista yleisen tasapainon mallia ja 
otetaan huomioon tehokkuustappiot, joita aiheutuu taloudenpitäjien reaktioista ve-
rojen ja maksujen muutoksiin. Malli on sovitettu Suomen talouteen, missä väestön 
ikääntyminen etenee nopeasti lähivuosina ja aiheuttaa veronkorotuspaineita. Työn 
verotuksen kiristyminen vähentää työvoiman tarjontaa, hidastaa kasvua ja aiheut-
taa hyvinvointitappioita. Puskuroimalla rahastojen avulla verojen korotustarvetta 
voidaan lisätä työn tarjontaa ja lievittää hyvinvointitappioita. Vaikutukset ovat 
merkittäviä lähivuosikymmenien aikana, jolloin verojen korotustarve on suurim-
millaan samalla, kun työmarkkinat ovat kireimmillään. Rahastoja on mahdollista 
käyttää puskuroimaan verotuksen kiristymistä. Näin voidaan tehdä jonkin verran 
ilman että pitkän aikavälin kestävyys vaarantuu, sillä työvoiman tarjonnan lisäys 
muuttaa tuotannon rakennetta työvoimavaltaisemmaksi, mikä puolestaan tukee 
julkisen talouden tasapainoa. 
 
Avainsanat: väestön ikääntyminen, yleisen tasapainon malli, julkinen talous, julki-
sen talouden rahastot 
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Population ageing is a major issue in most of the European countries. The
average old age dependency ratio for the EU is projected to roughly double in
the coming four decades. Demographic trends are unfavourable in virtually all
EU countries, whereas the extent and timing of ageing stress diﬀer substantially
across countries.
One example of a country where the ageing problem is severe and acute
is Finland. Whereas in most countries demographic shifts start from the
late 2020s, in Finland demographic change is already in progress. Finnish
demographic structure is dominated by baby boom cohorts that were born
earlier and were clearly larger than in other countries. The fertility rate
increased to an exceptionally high level (3.5 children per woman) after the
second world war and went into a steep decline already in the 1960s, earlier
than in other countries. As a consequence, record-large age cohorts have been
reaching retirement age already in recent years, at the same time when cohorts
entering work force are at their smallest. These trends will raise the old age
dependency ratio from the current ca 25 per cent to more than 40 per cent by
2015. After that, the ratio will gradually level oﬀ at around 45 per cent.
To address ageing pressures, two kind of policy actions have been taken in
Finland. First, the pension system have been revamped. A group of smaller
revisions were eﬀected in the 1990s and then, eﬀective from 2005, there were
some very fundamental changes in the public pension system. In particular,
labour supply incentives were increased. Beneﬁt ratios were lowered by linking
the replacement rate explicitly to expected life span and to retirement age.
The second fundamental change was an increase in pension funding as well
as a cut in state indebtedness. This has increased the ﬁnancial wealth of
general government. The general government net debt (debt of centrl and local
governments minus public pension funds), which was amounted to 20 per cent
of GDP at the end of 1990s, posted an asset surplus of about 30 per cent at the
end of 2006. Under the current pension scheme government funds will increase
further. For example, under the current funding rule, public pension funds are
projected to increase to two and half times the wage bill by 2030 and remain
at that level even after the population structure is stabilized.1 Altogether, the
public pension funding and the entire general government wealth position in
Finland is stronger than in other EU countries. In spite of this, sustainability of
general government ﬁnances requires further increases in pension contribution
rates and tax rates.
In this paper we discuss the role of public pension funding in the situation
Finland is facing. With the dependency ratio increasing rapidly, causing rises
in pension contribution rates and wage taxes, we would ask: to what extent can
pension funds or state debt be used as an instrument to lower the adjustment
costs of ageing? This issue is, no doubt, quite the opposite of the problems
most EU countries are currently facing. Rather modest public pension funding
is feared to increase future tax pressures and violate intergenerational fairness.
1Biström, Elo, Klaavo, Risku and Sihvonen (2008)
7The need for greater prefunding of public pension schemes is widely recognized,
and some countries are already on the way to increasing their funding rates.2
Despite quite large prefunding relative to other countries, Finland’s pension
scheme is a deﬁned beneﬁt PAYG type, as are most public pension systems.
But, unlike in most European countries, the coverage of the mandatory
public pension scheme is extensive. Private voluntary pension insurance is
in practice quite negligible. The earnings-related pension scheme is accrued at
the individual level. Pension contributions accrue to future pension beneﬁts
according to certain accrual rates, without upper limits in pension beneﬁts.
On the aggregate level, however, the accrual rates are independent of changes
in general contribution rates, which are often subject to policy actions aimed
to correct possible sustainability gaps. That feature, in the end, distinguishes
it from the pure accrual pension schemes. Accordingly, since there are no links
between pension beneﬁt and contribution rate, any changes in contributions
w i l lh a v et h es a m ek i n d so fe ﬃciency costs as those generally attributed to
wage taxation. Moreover, since pension funding is collective, neither does the
pension funding rate aﬀect the expected future wealth of households.
On the other hand, in an ageing economy, pension funding and a strong
ﬁnancial position of the public sector are, no doubt, key factors in sustaining
the pension system and public ﬁnances. The strengthening of government
funding is an eﬃcient way to smooth the ﬁscal burden over generations. In
addition, under the assumption that the real interest rate exceeds the real
growth rate, the contribution rate under prefunding will be lower than the
PAYG contribution rate in the long term, when the pension system is mature
and demographic is completed.3 The drawback of the funding strategy in
ad e ﬁned beneﬁt system is, however, its distortionary eﬀects on the labour
market. In Finland, where funding rate remains high in a period of steeply
rising dependency ratio, it will put an extra burden on the economy. If labour
supply reacts strongly to tax changes, the longer term funding gains will be
oﬀset at least in the medium term.
Our question about the role of public funding in smoothing ageing costs
relates only partially to the main branches of pension literature. The literature
has on the other hand focused on analysing consequences of movement from
a publicly provided PAYG based pension scheme towards private investment
based funding.4 There are also numberous papers on the eﬀects of pension
funding on ﬁnancial markets, capital movements and the macroeconomy in
multiregion models.5 Closer to our question of funding adjustment in a small
open economy is the paper of Bovenberg and Knaap (2008) on pension funding
in the Netherlands. Also the paper of Jafarov and Leigh (2007) on ﬁscal
policy rules and pension funding in Norway relates to our topic. Both of
these countries face ageing pressures in situation analogous to that of Finland:
2See discussions on European pension reforms for example in Holzmann, MacKellar and
Rutkowski (2003).
3See discussion on PAYG and funding contribution rate in Hemming (1998).
4See for example Feldstein (2005), Bergstrom and Hartman (2007), Demange (2007) and
MCMorrow and Roeger (2004) as well as OECD (2007) for discussions of costs of pension
prefunding.
5Attanasio et al (2006) and Börsch-Supan et al (2003) as well as Saarenheimo (2004).
8public pension funds are substantial but public ﬁnances are unsustainable
under unchanged tax rates or spending policy. For the most part, however,
ageing-related stress on the economy is analysed by evaluating pension reforms.
In these considerations the issue of deadweight losses associated with ageing
induced tax changes depends on how reforms change the tax-beneﬁt link.6
Under clear tax-beneﬁtl i n k s ,e ﬃciency losses in terms of employment are
typically absent. In addition, since the analysis usually concentrates on the
closed economy case, a funding-induced increase in national saving tends
also increase real capital formation and productivity, thereby improving long
term growth prospects. In our case, under a public prefunding framework
with weak or absent tax-beneﬁt linkages, the advantages of funding are not
very clear-cut, particularly since in a small open economy framework real
interest rate reactions do not support economic growth. Besides the costs
of tax distortions, in deﬁned beneﬁt framework, increased prefunding does not
increase the wealth of households, unlike under an investment-based pension
scheme where prefunding partially substitutes for private saving thereby
reducing the funding-induced additional costs.
We use a dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model (DSGE) with
features that facilitate investigation of distortionary eﬀects of ﬁscal and pension
policy responses to ageing on the aggregate economy and separately on two age
groups representing life cycle phases of ‘a worker’ and ‘a retiree’. A pension
system with wage-dependent pension beneﬁts and collective prefunding is
incorporated into the model. Households’ wealth includes social security
wealth in the form of discounted pension entitlements, independent of funding
and contribution rates. Realistic population change is incorporated into
the model by the means of ageing shocks representing current population
prognoses. The model contains separate ﬁscal policy rules and accounts for the
state and public pension institution. Moreover the supply side, labour market
and production, is explicitly modelled.
Simulation experiments made clear that, during the transition to an older
population structure, ageing costs can be lowered, allowing public funds
to smooth out tax reactions. Lower tax rates stimulate labour supply at
the moment when the labour market is most tight. Under lower funding,
ageing leads to less growth of labour costs, better employment and faster
production growth. Given the collective nature of pension funding, cutting
back on funding did not redistribute welfare between retirees and workers.
A l t o g e t h e rt h ee x p e r i m e n ti n d i c a t e dq u i t es u b s t a n t i a lg a i n sa c h i e v a b l eo f
funding adjustment. Since interest rate reactions for a small open economy
are absent, even temporarily lower taxation exerts long term eﬀects on factor
prices, thereby changing the production structure to a more labour-intensive
one. In our experiment the funding rate could be lowered by 20 percentage
points of the wage bill from the currently prevailing level without any losses
in welfare.
6See for example Jaag, Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg (2007) and Nickel, Rother and
Theophilopoulou (2008).
9The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model, including a description of the pension system. Sections 3 discuss the
results from policy experiment. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
The model used in this paper features dynamic optimization of a small open
economy. It is based on Gertler’s (1999) overlapping generations model, which
merges the perpetual youth model of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) with
an important aspect of life-cycle behaviour. Our model is an extention of
Gertler’s model in the sense that it allows for distortionary taxation and
time varying demographics. Households are forward looking, with stochastic
transition from work to retirement and from retirement to death, which
captures the life cycle behaviour of households. The deﬁned beneﬁtp e n s i o n
system is part of households’ social security wealth and, accordingly, future
pension entitlements are considered equal to other public transfers.
OLG features of the model facilitate investigating intergenerational aspects.
Supply side (production structure) is based on CES production technology with
factor augmentation in the underlying technological progress and nominal and
real rigidities. The model is closed by ﬁscal rules. Budgetary solvency of public
ﬁnances is achieved by setting an explicit target for public pension funds and
ad e b tt a r g e tf o ro t h e rg o v e r n m e n tﬁnances. In a small open economy, any
imbalance between domestic savings and investment is reﬂected in the net
foreign asset position.
Given our focus on the policy of public funding, the key relationships are
the setting of ﬁscal policy rules and the way taxation aﬀects the labour market,
households’ wealth and intergenerational wealth distribution. The model and
the impact of population ageing in a DSGE model is reported in detail in
Kilponen, Kinnunen and Ripatti (2007). The benchmark for the simulations is
an economy where ageing-related demographic change is already incorporated
in the model outcome.
2.1 Households
Households smooth consumption over the lifecycle. An individual lives for two
distinct periods: in the ﬁrst period as a worker and in the second as a retiree.
Transitions from work to retirement and from retirement to death are captured
by parameters measuring the length of the working period and life-expectancy.
2.1.1 Demographics and preferences
D e m o g r a p h i cp a r a m e t e r sv a r yi nt i m ea n da r es e tt op r o d u c ear e a l i s t i c



















where the number of working population ˆ Nw
t+1grows at an exogenous growth
rate 1+nw
t+1 and ωt is the probability that an individual remains a worker in
the next period, while the probability of retiring is 1−ωt. Once an individual
has retired, she faces a periodic probability of death of (1 − γt).
In the steady state, the demographic change has ended, so that
ϕ =
1 − ω
ˆ N − γ
(2.2)
ˆ N = ˆ N
w = ˆ N
r (2.3)
Households smooth consumption over the lifecycle and maximize a welfare
function formulated separately for worker and retiree. Workers’ preferences
reﬂect the period at work and the expected period at retirement while retirees
take into account, beyond retirement period, also the ‘interim’ period when
they participate in the labour market upon retirement. This categorising is
needed to enable us to capture the tax eﬀects on labour supply of retirees.
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t = βγt. (2.5)
z = w,r indicates whether the individual is a worker or retiree. The ﬁnite
(constant) intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ =1 /(1−ρc) indicates the
willingness to smooth consumption over time. Parameter υ is the elasticity of
periodic utility with respect to consumption. The retirees’ eﬀective discount
factor β
r takes into account the periodic probability of death.
AR e t i r e e
The maximation problem for a retiree born at time j, retiring at time k and

















































t denotes pension beneﬁts. Retirees who participate in the workforce are
11assumed to have lost part of their eﬃciency compared to workers. Relative
eﬃciency is denoted by ξ<1.E ﬃciency slow-down captures, besides
real labour productivity, another factor that lowers retirees’ labour input as
measured by work days, such as part time work. Parameter β is the subjective
discount factor, Pc
t is a price index for consumption and tt is the total labour
income tax rate including pension contribution rate, tWP
t .
Retirees’ human capital is Hr
t and social security wealth Sr
t.W e a l t h i s
valued on a net basis, after wage taxes and taxes levied on pension income
as well as pension contributions. Maximizing with respect to consumption













where  tπt is retirees’ marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Hr
t and
Sr
t represent discounted after-tax labour income and pensions. They evolve as
H
r


















T h eg r o w t hr a t eo fr e t i r e e s ˆ Nr
t+1 is entered into the discount factor because
total social security payments (pensions) are distributed equally among
retirees. Also the discount factor for human wealth is augmented by the growth
rate of retirees. Retiree’s marginal propensity to consume out of wealth  tπt
evolves according to the following non-linear diﬀerence equation


























t . A retiree’s marginal propensity to consume varies
with the real interest rate, Rt+1/ ˆ Pc
t+1, as well as with expected changes in real
net wage income. In addition, the survival probability, γ,inﬂuences a retiree’s
eﬀective discount rate, thereby introducing further dynamics into the marginal
propensity to consume equation.
A Worker




































t denotes ﬁnancial transfers to workers and tt is the total labour













where πt is the worker’s marginal propensity to consume and Hw
t and Sw
t
denote human and social security wealth.





















where Ωt+1 is the factor that weights the gross real return Rt+1/ ˆ Pc
t+1.T h i s
















where  t+1 > 1is the ratio of a retiree’s marginal propensity to consume to
that of a worker.
Hw
t i st h ed i s c o u n t e ds u mo faw o r k e r ’ sw a g eb i l l( i nn e tt e r m s )a n dSw
t
is the sum across workers alive at t of the capitalized value of social security
(in net terms). Both of these measures take account of the corresponding



































































t+1 are the values of human wealth and social security for a
working retiree who retires at time t +1but is still working at time t.T h e
enlarged discount rate due to the presence of Ωt+1 > 1 in the denominator
means that workers value human wealth and social security less than does a
retiree. This tends to reduce the worker’s consumption and increase saving
compared to a retiree.
The factor ˆ Nw
t+1 augments the discount rate of the capitalized value of a
worker’s social security because the share of total social security entitlements
going to those currently alive declines over time as the working-age population
grows. By a similar argument, ˆ Nw
t+1 enters into the discount factor of aggregate
human wealth.
132.1.2 Labour and wages
Standard labour supply for a retiree born at time j, retiring at time k and






















where tt denotes taxes levied on labour income.
In the model, the worker faces a quadratic adjustment in re-setting the
wage rate. A fraction of workers is assumed to adjust wages in each period.
For those not able to optimize in the period, the wage is adjusted using the
steady state growth rate of wages, denoted d¯ w, which equals the steady state
productivity growth rate plus the inﬂation rate.














(1 − q)βd¯ w
(1 + β(1 − q)2d¯ w2)
EtWt+1 +
(1 − q)d¯ w
(1 + β(1 − q)2d¯ w2)
Wt−1 (2.22)
+
q(1 − (1 − q)βd¯ w2)






t is consumption of workers, Nw
t is worker population, Lw
t denotes
the number of workers demanded, q ∈ (0,1) is the exogenous probability that
determines how often a randomly chosen worker is allowed to re-set her wage.
The equation for the optimal wage rate, W∗
t , is derived directly from the
aggregate version of worker’s labour supply decision.
Workers’ and retirees’ aggregate labour supply is derived by multiplying



























Aggregate labour supply is measured by the eﬀective labour supply index,







Labour demand for workers, Lw
t , is derived by assuming that retirees are
always on their labour supply curve at the prevailing wage (W), and domestic
intermediate goods producers are on their labour demand curve.
142.1.3 Wealth distribution, ﬁnancial assets and aggregate consumption
Since workers discount wealth at a higher rate than retirees, they tend
to consume a smaller part of any wealth increase. This means that the
distribution of wealth is an essential element in aggregate consumption.
Using previous equations for human and social security wealth, the share
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t denote discounted after-tax values of labour income and
pensions as denoed above, and  tπt is retirees marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth.
Assuming that all assets are eventually held by domestic consumers,


















Individuals receive transfers from both the central government and pension
funds. However, in order to maintain analytical tractability, pensions
are related to the prevailing aggregate wage level but not to individual
characteristics.
Financial assets available to consumers consist of three items: domestic
government bonds, AS
t , foreign bonds, AW
t , and stocks issued by domestic
ﬁrms, AF




In simulations, asset returns on domestic and foreign bonds are assumed
to equalize (rS
t = rF
t ). The share price rD
t is the nominal price (ex-dividend)
of a unit of equity in period t.T h ef a c t o rd e ﬁning the gross return on stocks
is ﬁrms’ proﬁts, ΠD
t .













t denotes the corporate tax rate.
2.1.4 Welfare
Workers welfare can be written using (2.6) and (2.12) and the corresponding

















Retirees welfare evolves analogously to that of the workers with diﬀerences
only in propensity to consume and in labour eﬃciency rate
15V
r

















Given that agents maximise welfare over their life-cycles, welfare measures
represent discounted future value for an average worker or a retiree at each
moment. Consequently, the welfare eﬀects of a policy or economic shock
depends on its direct impact on wealth and on its impact on discount rates.
Moreover, welfare is aﬀected by tax-distortions from the labour market.
2.2 Social security
2.2.1 Pension expenditures
The model’s pension expenditures are linked to the demographic structure and
aggregate wages such that T R
t = μtNr
t Wt, where μt
¡
=¯ et/ ¯ W
¢
is the average
pension rate evaluated at the initial steady state level of aggregate wages ¯ W.
Total pension expenditures, T R
t , a r et h u sl i n k e dt oa v e r a g ew a g e sa n dt h e
number of pensioners. Making use of our demographic assumptions, we can
express pension expenditures per capita in terms of the dependency ratio,












Pension expenditure is the component that brings ageing structure to social
security wealth. Other transfers for households are assumed to evolve in line
with production growth. In simulating demographic shocks, we have pension
beneﬁts depend on wage developments over the longer time, thereby imitating
the actuarial structure of the pension system.
2.2.2 Fiscal balances
General government is divided into two sectors: state government (central
and local governments) and pension funds. Separation of sectors allows us to
investigate pension funding apart from other ﬁscal policy questions. This is
well-grounded from the intergenerational viewpoint since tax treatment diﬀers
for retirees and workers. On the public spending side, in turn, pension outlays
are in principle equal to other public transfers not linked to tax payments. In
that sense pension funding is equivalent to government debt.7
7In practice, separation is well-grounded also because administration of pension funds is
usually independent from the central government. For example in Finland pension policy is
quite independent from other public administration and ﬁscal policy setting. Even though
the govenment in the end makes formal decisions on contribution rates, pension funds are
de facto governed by an entity outside the government consisting of three parties: labour
union, insurance companies and the government. For more detailes see Finnish Centre for
Pensions (2007).
16The ﬁscal balance of the state consists of three taxes: labour income
is taxed at the rate tWS
t , capital gains tax levied at the rate tK
t and
consumption taxed at the indirect tax rate tC
t . State expenditure items are
consumption, CS
t ,transfers to ﬁrms and households, T S
t , and interest payments
on government debt with nominal rate of , rt.The state issues government
bonds amounting to AS













t) (income tax revenue)
+ t
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t (total net transfers)
− rtA
S
t−1 (interest payments) (2.32)
Accordingly, the ﬁscal balance of public pension funds consists of pension
contributions levied on wage income. Pensions are ﬁnanced by collecting
pension contributions from ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sa sw e l la sf r o mr e v e n u ef r o m




separate rates for employers’ and employees’ contributions. Pensions to retirees
total T PR
t and include, besides old age pensions, disability pensions and other
pensions. Pension funds accumulate ﬁnancial assets AP
t .


















The model is closed by the tax rule and contribution rate rule set separately
for the state and the public pension funds. Fiscal targets are set to maintain
sustainability in terms of the SGP requirement for general government ﬁnance.
17The state targets the debt/GDP ratio and adjusts the labour income tax
rate to stabilize debt at the targeted level within a ‘proper’ time horizon. The














where ¯ AS/Yt is an exogenous target for the actual indebtedness ratio. If the
government spending ratio is exogenous, the debt will also render the steady
state tax rate exogenous, in eﬀect determined unambiguously by the debt ratio.
The parameters θ1and θ2 determine the speed of adjustment. In the benchmark
simulations, the debt ratio is a constant set at the steady state value of 0.5.
Values of the adjustment parameters were set at θ1=0.08 and θ2=0.9, which
cause the debt ratio to proceeding smoothly to the target within the period of
demographic changes.
Using the same analogy, the pension contribution rate is targeted at the





















where ϕt is old age dependency ratio and ¯ AP/WtLt =1 .6 is the targeted value
of the pension fund relative to the wage sum in the steady state. The faster
the change in the dependency ratio, the slower the funding rate will approach
the target.
Altogether, in our benchmark, given targets will bring the net debt of
general government to about 20 per cent of GDP, which represents the
sustainability ratio of unchanged net debt position that is applied as a
sustainability criteria of in the framework of public survaillance in the EU.
2.2.4 Production
The supply side is based on a production structure where domestic
intermediate goods are combined with imported intermediate goods to produce
ﬁnal goods, broken down into consumption goods, capital goods and export
goods. Producers of intermediate goods combine labour and and capital
using CES production technologies with factor-augmenting technical trends
exogenously given. The production diﬀers across ﬁnal goods in terms of
elasticity of substitution.
8See the discussion of Mitchell, Sault and Wallis (2000) on the properties of ﬁscal rules
in macro models. See also Railavo (2004) for a discussion of alternative ﬁscal policy rules
and their stability properties.
18Production of intermediate goods
















where Kt is capital, LF
t labour, parameters ΛK
t and ΛL
t denote time-varying
capital and labour-augmenting technical progress respectively, 1/(1 + ρ) is
elasticity of technical substitution with ρ the substitution parameter and δ
the share parameter in the production function. The technical change is
labour-augmenting on the balanced growth path.


























where Rt denotes the nominal rental price of capital services and WF
t =( 1+
tF
t )Wt represents nominal labour costs including employers’ pension and social
security contributions.




The ﬁrst order conditions (in logs) with respect to capital services and labour
are given by
rt − pt =l o gδ − log(Υ) − ρlogΛ
K
t +( 1+ρ)(yt − kt) (2.38)
w
F
t − pt =l o g ( 1− δ) − log(Υ) − ρlogΛ
L
t +( 1+ρ)(yt − lt) (2.39)
The aggregate pricing equation for intermediate goods producers, assuming
Calvo pricing, is of the form
∆pt = βEt∆pt+1 + Ξ[υ + mct − pt] (2.40)
where Ξ captures the frequency of price changes.9 Inﬂation is determined by
expected inﬂation and log markup υ over the real marginal costs mct − pt.
Production of ﬁnal goods
Final goods producers combine domestic intermediate inputs and imported
goods. Producers take the market price for their products as given, since
product markets are set to be competitive. The demand for retailers’ output





where 1 − ζ (ζ ∈ [0,1]) is the constant probability of implementing a price change. Since
there is a continuum of intermediate producers, 1−ζ also represents the share of producers
that are able to change their prices. The average time between price changes is given by
1/(1 − ζ).
19sectors. The output of the consumption-goods retailer divides into the private
consumption and public purchases of market goods, CT
t ≡ CH
t + CSF
t .T h e
capital-goods retailer faces similar demand comprising private sector and
public sector investment, IT
t ≡ It + IS
t .





















j is the respective share parameter and ρj the respective substitution
parameter (σj =1 /(1 + ρj). Mj denotes imports and Y j the domestic
intermediate good. Cost minimization generates following price indices
P
j

























































The consumption-goods producer (retailer) pays the indirect taxes, tC
t . Hence
the tax base for indirect taxes consists of private consumption and government
purchases. No indirect taxes are levied on investment goods.
The exporter is a ﬁrm that combines domestic intermediate input, Y X
t ,
and imported raw materials, MR
t , to produce export good, Xt, in competitive
markets. Technology and preferences are identical to those of the retailers.
Capital rental ﬁrms
Production capital is modelled as a homogeneous factor of production that
is owned by a ﬁrm that rents capital to producers of domestic intermediate
goods. The capital rental ﬁrm operates under perfect competition. Physical
capital accumulation generates real adjustment costs in the form of lost capital
stock. Capital accumulation is given by
K
p












t−1 (1 − δK) (2.41)
where S(·) denotes adjustment costs of physical capital stock and δK is the










20subject to the capital accumulation equation (2.41) and the deﬁnition of capital
services,10 Kt = K
p
t−1. Its momentary proﬁts are given by
Π
K



















t−1 (1 − δK)
¢
(2.43)
The price index for investment goods, PI
t , is the price index of the domestic
investment good retailer and Rt denotes rental rate for capital. Future proﬁts




t+s].T h eﬁrst order condition with respect to
capital stock K
p

















































Due to the end-of-period timing of physical capital stock, the accumulated
physical capital is in use in the following period. Hence, the expected following
period’s rental rate, Rt+1,governs the current period investment decision. The















The usual ‘investment equation’ can be obtained by substituting the
parametric version of adjustment costs for theshare parameter in the ﬁrst order
condition.
2.3 Market equilibrium
All markets are in equilibrium at all point of time. The capital goods market
is in equilibrium when the supply of capital services by the capital-rental
ﬁrm equals the demand for capital services by intermediate goods producers.
Similarly, the labour markets are in equilibrium when the demand for labour
equals its supply, Ls
t = LD
t . In the intermediate goods sector, the demand for







t = Yt (2.46)






















10For simplicity we assume that capital services obtain a lagged value of physical capital
stock. In a more general case capital services would depend also on the endogenous
utilization rate. This extension alters the results only in business cycle frequencies and
is thus beyond the scope of this study.
21where PW
t is the aggregated export price of competing economies and MW
t is
aggregate imports of export markets. When the market clearing conditions
hold, the workers’ and pensioners’ budget constraints (2.7) and (2.13), the
general government budget constraint (2.36) and the pension fund’s budget
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trade balance
(2.48)
The current account balance is given by St(AW
t −AW




2.4 Key model parameters
The model’s key parameters are calibrated to reﬂect the main features of the
Finnish economy. Calibration principles are described and discussed in detail
in Kilponen and Ripatti (2006). Key parameters of the model are summarised
in the following table.
Given our interest in distortionary eﬀects of taxes, the crucial parameter
aﬀecting our results is the periodic utility of consumption, which determines
the labour supply elasticities. The elasticity of utility is calibrated at 0.80 and
it produces uncompensated labour supply elasticity values of 0.23—0.26. This
is broadly in line with elasticities applied in the standard European models.
Elasticity of labour supply is of course highly uncertain. Concerning the ageing
issues, some authors have argued that European elasticities could be much
higher if, for example, all the ways in which taxes aﬀect labour-supply decisions
of retirees were taken properly into account.11 An actuarially unfair deﬁned
beneﬁt system, in particular, tend to raise the implicit tax rate for a retiree.
High tax rates also create incentives for early retirement. Unfortunately, our
model setting does not allow us to investigate these impacts. In principle for
Finland, where mandatory public pension scheme is exceptionally extensive
and tax-beneﬁt links are particularly weak, the calibrated values of labour
supply elasticities can be considered conservative.
11According to Jacobs (2008) uncompensated elasticity of tax base could double in Europe
if besides labour supply, also retirement and learning are endogenised.
22Table 1. Key model parameters
Households
β Subjective discount factor, parameter 0.99
v Elasticity of periodic utility with respect to consumption 0.80
σ Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, parameter 0.45
ξ Labour eﬃciency of retirees, parameter 0.30
  Relative marginal propensity to consume, variable 1.59
π Worker’s marginal propensity to consume, variable 0.019
Ω Additional discounting factor 1.10
¯ νw Elasticity of labour supply (workers), variable 0.26
¯ νr Elasticity of labour supply (pensioners), variable 0.23
Production
ˆ ΛL Labour-saving technical change p.a., parameter 2.08
δ
K Capital depreciation rate, parameter 0.08
Υ Price markup, parameter 1.08
¯ AF/¯ Π Price to equity ratio, variable 15.0
δ Capital share parameter 0.1
ρ El. of substitution between capital and labour 0.72
Public ﬁnances
θ1 Fiscal rule adjustment, parameter 0.08
θ2 Fiscal rule adjustment, parameter 0.9
aS State debt (% of output) 0.50
aP Pension funds (% of wage bill) 1.7
cS Public consumption (% of output) 20.8
T SW Transfers to workers (% of output) 6.4
τK Corporate tax rate %, parameter 19.2
τC Sales tax rate %, parameter 21.0
Interest rate
¯ RF/ ˆ Pc Real interest rate, p.a., variable 2.4
3 Simulations
3.1 Benchmark economy
The benchmark for simulations is an economy where demographic changes
have already passed through to the economic structure, eg labour market,
production and public ﬁnances. After demographic shock, the economy grows
along a new steady state growth path where the old age dependency ratio
is permanently higher than in the initial steady state without ageing. The
demographic shock is calibrated using parameters for the dependency ratio
and propability of death to closely represent the situation Finland is facing in
the light of current population projections.
23Public ﬁnancies are sustainable in terms of the SGP deﬁnition with
government net debt remaining unchanged in the long term.12 The wage
tax rate and pension contribution rates adjust to keep the state debt and
pension funds at the currently prevailing level in relation to GDP or wage
bill. Other tax parameters, as well as government consumption as a share
of GDP, are assumed to remain unchanged. Table 2 presents the main
ﬁscal and macroeconomic variables at the initial steady state, where the
demographic structure is assumed to be unchanged and at ﬁnal steady state
after a permanent demographic shock.
Table 2. Public ﬁnances, labour market and households’ welfare:
Initial steady states and the ﬁnal steady state in aged
economy (benchmark)
Initial Benchmark
Income tax rate % of workers, implicit 29.2 39.9
Pension contribution rate (ﬁrms and workers), implicit 19.9 27.0
Pension expenditure (% of output), variable 11.3 15.0
Employment rate, workers 0.745 0.61
Employment rate, retirees 0.17 0.32
Output growth, % 2.2 1.7
Private consumption per capita 4.7 4.0
Distribution of ﬁnancial asset wealth, variable 0.17 0.25
Capital-output ratio 1.93 1.92
Net foreign assets % of output -21.1 35.6
Under unchanged government net funds, reﬂecting the steep increase in the
old age dependency ratio, labour tax rates had to increase altogether by
about 17 percentage points in the long term (Table 2).13 Both the pension
contribution rate and wage tax rate should increase. As a consequence, because
of distortionary taxation, the employment rate of workers would be in the
steady state much lower than under stationary demography. That dominates
the overall employment developments. Retirees’ employment rate increases
slightly. This is due to the fact that retirees’ desire to compensate a decline
in after tax wealth dominates the negative eﬀect caused by a decline in wage
compensation. Also real growth will be slower, consumption per capita lower
and retirees’ share of ﬁn a n c i a lw e a l t hm u c hl a r g e rt h a ni nt h ei n i t i a ls t e a d y
state. A more detailed description of ageing eﬀects is reported in Kilponen,
Kinnunen and Ripatti (2007).
Altogether, in the benchmark, sustainability of public ﬁnances requires
large tax hikes. The tax burden should increase during the period when
government is a net creditor in the ﬁnancial market and the labour market
is extreamly tight.
12More precisely, the sustainability condition represents sustainability with the S2
indicator fulﬁlling the intertemporal budget constraint over an inﬁnite horizon.
13Note that possible eﬀects of pension reform were not included. According to Ministry
of Finance (2007), the direct eﬀect of ageing on general government would amount to 8
p.p. of GDP. Finnish Centre of Pensions estimates that pension contribution rate should be
increased by 4 p.p.(see Biström et al (2008) ). Both institutions took reform into account.
243.2 Funding adjustments during demographic transition
In this section we consider government assets as an additional policy option in
alleviating ageing stress. Simulation results are compared to the benchmark
situation where government funds remain unchanged in relation to GDP. In
the following simulations we assume that pension fund targeting is relaxed and
endogenised to respond inversely to changes in the dependency ratio (see 2.38).
A new target is set to reduce the current ratio of 1.7 to 1.4 after completion of
demographic change by the end of the 2050s. In terms of general government
net assets to GDP, that means a decline from the prevailing level of 25 per cent
of GDP to about to 10 per cent (Figure 1). Net lending of General Government
would raise the deﬁcit by 1 percentage point of GDP at its highest at the
beginning of the period. The magnitude of targeted pension funds represents
the level that would maintain sustainability of the public ﬁnances and would
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Figure 1: Adjustment in government funds
Given the small open economy environment with ﬁxed interest rates, the
counterpart of the weakening of the general government ﬁnancial position is
in net foreign ﬁnancial assets. A reduction in government assets means that
the current account surplus declines due to lower national saving. Net foreign
assets decline by about 10 percentage points as a consequence of fund run-down
in the long run (Figure 2).
The following ﬁgures display simulation results. The top panel of Figure
3 shows that the dampening of pension fund accumulation would clearly ease
14Since under normal assumption the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate,
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Figure 2: Foreign net assets in the benchmark and simulation
the tax burden on labour. The need to raise the pension contribution rate
remains about 3 percentage points lower up to 2020 and the increase in wage
taxes would remain about 2 percentage points smaller during the same time.
The diﬀerence versus the benchmark in overall tax burden on labour peaks
at the midpoint of the 2020s and amounts to 5.5 percentage points of wage
bill. Pension contribution rates could stay lower than in the benchmark also
for quite a long time, covering the entire period of demographic transition. In
our experiment, tax rates actually do not reach the benchmark level until after
four decades.
Labour market reactions to lower tax rates indicate substantial employment
gains (second and third panel of Figure 3). The employment rate of workers
would be nearly one percentage point higher on average during the next 15
years and retirees’ employment would improve even in absolute terms as a
reaction to a tax cut. Retirees’ labour supply reacts stronger than workers’,
reﬂecting a wage set-up for the model with retirees reacting along their labour
supply curve. Workers’ employment reactions are more subdued because an
increase in average wage will reduce labour demand. Due to the increase in
average wages and labour supply, the capital-labour ratio, which declines after
a tax cut, increases later on, at around 2015.
A lower tax burden increases the present value of net human capital as
well as social security wealth, since pension beneﬁts are subject to income
taxation (Figure 4). Improved wealth boosts consumption and labour demand.
The consumption level would stay during the demographic transition about
2 percentage points above the benchmark. GDP real growth will exceed
benchmark by more than 1 percentage point on average during the same period.
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Capital-labour ratio, dev. from the benchmark
Figure 3: Results of an experiment where funding rate declines
The model with heterogenous agents allows us to consider intergenerational
eﬀects of fund adjustment. Figure 4 shows that consumption of retirees
constantly rises a bit more than that of workers. Retirees and workers diﬀer
with respect to planning horizon and combination of wealth. Retirees’ shorter
planning horizon means that any policy changes that aﬀect their net present
v a l u eo fw e a l t hi ss m o o t h e do v e ras h o r t e rp e r i o dt h a nt h a to fw o r k e r s .T h i s
and retirees’ larger marginal propensity to consume out of wealth lead them
to respond more strongly than workers to tax changes. But lower funding
has practically no eﬀect on income distribution. Welfare measures conﬁrm
the overall result. During the transition period, both retirees and workers are
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GDP: deviation from the benchmark, %
Figure 4: Results of an experiment where funding rate declines
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivy of the experiment was investigated under alternative assumptions
as to some key parameters of the model. We conducted the same simulation
experiment allowing parameter estimates to vary around the values used in
the base simulations.15
First we set the periodic elasticity of consumption, v, at slightly higher or
lower than in the benchmark. Fund adjustments are particularly sensitive to
cuts in the elasticity parameter (Figure 5). In particular, a lower elasticity
value strengthens the labour supply reaction (see 2.29 and 2.20). Then lower
funding with a lower tax rate gives a stronger boost to labour supply, allowing
for larger tax reductions. This also improves after tax wealth compared to the
benchmark simulations and can be seen to have larger eﬀect on consumption
per capita. The following ﬁgures show, instead, how an increase of the same
magnitude in the elasticity of consumption would make hardly any diﬀerence
compared to the benchmark.
15The chosen procedure was not quite accurate since the balanced growth paths were
not controlled for. If steady state values change substantially, due to parameter changes,
then the analysed deviation from benchmark might not be guite comparable. This bias
seems to relate to low values of the parameter v and particularly the reactions of retirees’
participation. The employment rate of retirees gets quite diﬀerent initial and ﬁnal steady
state values with a lower parameter value than in the benchmark.
28Elast. of periodic cons. low: ν =0.79
Baseline simulation result ν=0.82
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Figure 5: Alternative reactions on funds adjustment: elasticity of periodic
utility of consumption varies
Secondly, we varied the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter,
σ. Figure 6 indicates only a slight variation in tax rates, employment and
consumption. Lower values for the IES parameter, when households are
slightly more willing to allow consumption to vary over time, brings foreword
slightly the gains of funds adjustment in terms of consumption per capita.
The last parameter we varied was the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour, ρ.A n o t i c a b l e e ﬀect is that, with a higher elasticity of
substitution, employment of workers improves a bit more but somewhat later
then in the benchmark (Figure 7). If capital and labour are more readily
substitutable, lower pension contribution rates for employers induce them to
demand more labour (see eq. 2.41).
Besides uncertainties associated with parameter values, important risks are
naturally related to demographic trends. Using stochastic population forecasts
for Finnland, Lassila and Valkonen (2008) reported substantial variations
in forecasts. For example, they found a 50 per cent propability that the
number of prime age workers in Finland is between 2.4 million and 2.8 million.
Uncertainty as to aggregate labour supply however increase with a long lag
when the fertility risk is realised, which will take place after 2—3 decades.
29IES low: σ =0.30
Baseline simulation result σ =0.45
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Figure 6: Alternative reactions on funds adjustment: Intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES) varies
3.4 Steady state results
The simulation experiment shows that ageing costs can be lowered if funding
is used to smooth tax reactions during the transition period of demographic
change. An interesting point here is that the reduction in prefunding exerts
only minor eﬀects on welfare or economic activity in the long term. Table
3 shows that in our experiment the levels of labour taxation, employment,
consumption and welfare remain practically the same as in the benchmark,
even though less (some 20 percentage points of GDP) ﬁnancial resourses are
devoted to preparing future pension outlays. This is in contrast to the fact that
in the long term pension prefunding should be preferable to a PAYG pension
scheme when the real interest rate exceeds the real growth rate, as it does in
our set-up. Thus, in the steady state, the PAYG contribution rate should be
higher than that under prefunding. With this in mind, our results should be
interpreted cautiously: under certain limits and certain circumstances, pension
prefunding may also raise long term costs.
A reduction in the funding rate produced only minor steady state eﬀects
for the macroeconomy. Smaller tax increases than in the benchmark, however,
led to a slightly lower wage level, thereby making the production structure
30El. of subst. betw. cap. and labour low: ρ =0.65
Baseline simulation result ρ=0.72
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Employment rate: workers
Figure 7: Alternative reactions on funds adjustment: Elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital varies
slightly more labour intensive. Transitional changes seem to have exerted long
term eﬀects on the production structure. A lower wage level also means lower
pension beneﬁts compared to the benchmark. This means that the property
income of pension funds will cover a larger share of pension beneﬁts, which
helps to reach the benchmark welfare and consumption levels with smaller
prefunding. Note also that, even under larger fund adjustments, tax rates and
welfare eﬀects remain quite modest (Figure 8). For example, moving from a
pure PAYG system to current funding level would lower the tax ratio by only
some 2 percentage points. This would reduce the welfare of consumers by
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Figure 8: Reactions of welfare and pension contribution rate on funding
adjustment in the steady state
Table 3. Long term eﬀect of funding adjustment
Steady states
Benchmark Lower funding
Pension funds, % of wage bill 1.7 1.4
State debt, % of GDP 0.5 0.5
Pension contribution rate 27.0 27.4
State taxes 39.9 40.1
Employment rate, workers 0.61 0.61
Employment rate, retirees 0.32 0.33
Wealth distribution 0.245 0.245
Consumption per capita 3.976 3.954
Welfare, workers 0.00346 0.00345
Welfare, retirees 0.00266 0.00264
Capital-output ratio 7.87364 7.86974
323.5 Discussion of results
Rather modest relaxation of the general government ﬁnancial target made
room for substantial tax reductions, with considerable economic consequences
during the demographic transition. The macroeconomic reactions are related
to tax distortions, the speciﬁc nature of public pension schemes and the
framework of a small open economy.
Concerning the pension scheme, the key issue is the lack of a tax-beneﬁt link
characteristic of a deﬁned beneﬁt public pension scheme. Since pension beneﬁts
at the individual level depend only on accrual parameters and past wages,
general changes in contribution rates do not aﬀect expected pension beneﬁts.
Contribution changes are driven by the need to maintain sustainability of
public ﬁnances, as assumed in our experiment instead of being a result
of pension parameter adjustments. Due to the lack of a tax-beneﬁt-link,
distortions from the labour market are of key importance. If, instead, the
actuarial parameters were adjusted, the economic consequences could be
quite diﬀerent. Adjustments in pension parameters would directly aﬀect
individual pension beneﬁts, thereby rendering contribution payments similar
to investments in annuities. In the literature on pension reforms, the degree
of actuarity has been pinpointed as a crucial condition for macroeconomic
reactions and intergenerational income distribution. Any policies that improve
the actuarial rate will lessen the distortionary eﬀects of the pension system. For
example Fischer and Keuschnigg (2007) found that reforms that streghthen the
tax-beneﬁt link clearly stimulated labour supply, even though the responses of
older workers and prime age workers went in opposite directions. Keuschnigg
(2008) pointed out that even in a DB pension scheme, changes in contribution
rates do not entail eﬀeciency losses if the beneﬁts change accordingly. Jaag,
et al (2007) also reported pronounced economic gains from Austrian pension
reform, which greatly improved the actuarity of the pension system.
The second issue related to design of the pension scheme is that, despite
prefunding, there is no link between fund return and pension beneﬁt. Neither
does the size of pension fund aﬀect households’ social security wealth. An
individual’s beneﬁt at retirement depends, not on the performance of asset
prices during that time, but on his earnings during his working years. Unlike in
an investment-based system, the actuarial present value of beneﬁts is not equal
to that of Social Security savings. Consequently, funding aﬀects distortions
only to the extent that it reduces pressures for contribution rate hikes. In
the literature, pension funding has generally been analysed from this point
of view. Typically, economic gains from funding have been found to come
from a reduction in distortions. For example, according to Feldstein (2005),
deadweight losses from social security insurance could clearly be diminished
by moving towards an investment-based funding system. Also Conesa and
Garriga (2008) found that smoothing tax reactions to ageing will generate
positive economic eﬀects in the framework of small open economy with tax
distortians. In the framework of public pension funding, Nickel, Rother
and Theophilapoulou (2008) designed policy options which incorporated tax
adjustments to a cut in the beneﬁt ratio. They found that steady state
consumption improved under a policy package comprising a cut in pension
33level and a cut in proportional corporate taxes. Supply side gains from lower
tax distortions boosted long term gains by changing factor prices.
Favourable economic reactions are also crucially related to the environment
of a small open economy. Neither interest rates nor capital supply respond
to changes in national saving. This strengthens the positive eﬀect of a tax
decline compared a closed economy framework. Bovenberg and Knaap (2007)
conﬁrmed this with the framework of the Dutch pension scheme. They
reported substantial gains in terms of macroeconomic variables and welfare
attainable from smoothing ageing-induced tax hikes by temporarely increasing
government debt. Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2006) also noted that
pension reforms were particularly welfare-improving in an open economy. They
compared diﬀerent pension policy options in the framework of a two-region
model.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
Given the growth in the old-age dependency ratio, ensuring sustainability of
public ﬁnances requires a substantial increase in tax burden or a down-grading
of Social Security in most European countries. This burden diﬀers by country,
depending on timing of ageing, covarage and generosity of the public pension
scheme, as well as the degree of prefunding. Our experiment highlighted the
use of the option of adjusting public funds in Finland, where ageing problems
are more severe than in any other European country, but where, on the other
hand, quite focal policy measures have already been taken to prepare for ageing
stress. In this paper public funds adjustment was considered as an additional
policy option to alleviate the costs tax hikes pose for the economy during the
transition to an older population structure. The analytical tool was the DSGE
model, which features the Finnish pension scheme with deﬁned beneﬁt, high
but collective funding and tax distortions.
A simulation experiment illustrated that, during the transition to an older
population structure, ageing costs can be lowered, allowing public funds
to decline and smoothing the tax reactions. Lower tax rates stimulate
labour supply when the labour market is tight. Easing the funding target
leads to a slower growth in the costs of labour, better employment and
faster production growth. Given the collective nature of pension funding,
a reduction in funding redistributed welfare between retirees and workers.
Altogether, the experiment indicated quite substantial gains achievable with
a funding adjustment during demographic transition. Macroeconomic gains
were supported by the framework of a small open economy. Since interest rate
reactions were absent, even temporarily lower taxation could change factor
prices thereby rendering the production structure more labour intensive. In
the experiment, the funding rate could be lowered by 20 percentage points of
the wage bill without any losses in welfare.
As discussed in this paper, Finland’s public pension scheme is unique in
many respects. Still, our experiment highlights issues common to all public
pension schemes. Concerning eﬀorts to increase public pension funding in
34other European countries, the long term costs of funding depend on how funds
could be used to smooth ageing pressures. In most European countries, the old
age dependency ratios start to accelerate in about 20 years time, which means
that pension funds could be accumulated before the labour market becomes
extremely tight. This creates room for ﬁscal policy to alleviate labour shortages
when ageing stresses are at their highest level.
Finally, there is a number of questions that require further investigations.
For example, the eﬀects of a pension funding change towards personal accounts
w o u l dh e l pt od e t e r m i n et h ee x t e n tt o which funding design would matter.
Also, a wider range of policy options would be interesting to investigate.
The most important further issue is the uncertainty associated with both the
demographics and the return on of government funds.
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